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Abstract
We propose regularization strategies for learning discriminative models that are
robust to in-class variations of the input data. We use the Wasserstein-2 geometry
to capture semantically meaningful neighborhoods in the space of images, and
define a corresponding input-dependent additive noise data augmentation model.
Expanding and integrating the augmented loss yields an effective Tikhonov-type
Wasserstein diffusion smoothness regularizer. This approach allows us to apply high
levels of regularization and train functions that have low variability within classes
but remain flexible across classes. We provide efficient methods for computing
the regularizer at a negligible cost in comparison to training with adversarial data
augmentation. Initial experiments demonstrate improvements in generalization
performance under adversarial perturbations and also large in-class variations of
the input data.
Key words: Wasserstein sample space; Gaussian distribution from Wasserstein
Diffusion process; Tikhonov regularization; Adversarial robustness.
1 Introduction
The sensitivity of trained discriminative models to small perturbations of the input data has become a
reason of concern and an important topic of research in recent years (Szegedy et al., 2014; Nguyen
et al., 2015). In particular, it has been observed that neural networks which have been trained to
have good test performance can be fooled when the inputs are slightly perturbed in a way that
is imperceptible to humans. This indicates a poor generalization ability, and specifically, that
the solutions found with naive training and validation techniques are not capturing appropriate
smoothness priors over the input space. A number of recent works have proposed approaches to
improve robustness to perturbations (Cissé et al., 2017; Liao et al., 2018; Samangouei et al., 2018;
Wang et al., 2018a; Finlay et al., 2019), while a complementary line of work probes the limitations of
trained networks (Salman et al., 2019) and develops strategies to generate adversarial attacks (Carlini
et al., 2017; Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016, 2017; Shafahi et al., 2019).
Intuitively, a smoother function at fixed training accuracy should be more robust to perturbations of
the input, including adversarial attacks. Therefore, one strategy is to train the discriminative function
with smoothness regularizers, such as noise added to the training examples (adversarial or random)
or penalizing the norm of the gradient with respect to the inputs. We note, however, that the notion of
a ‘small’ perturbation will strongly depend on how we decide to measure distances in the space of
inputs. The gradient and its norm depend on the geometric structure that is laid on input space.
While it is convenient to use the L2 metric (Euclidean), it is well understood that many data types of
interest are not Euclidean. In particular, the L2 metric does not measure distances between images in
the way that we perceive them. Changes that humans consider small, might correspond to changes that
the classifier considers to be large in this metric. Moreover, it is clear that a discriminative function
on image data should be more stable in certain directions and more variable in other directions. This
distinction is not well captured by isotropic smoothness regularizers.
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To construct more effective smoothness regularizers, two general approaches come to mind: 1)
Measure distances in a metric representation of the raw inputs, dφ(x, y)2 =
∑
j |φ(x)j − φ(y)j |2,
where φ is some feature representation function that might be trained separately from or together with
the discriminative task. Examples in this direction include preprocessing of the inputs by downsam-
pling (Guo et al., 2018), autoencoders, and approaches that regularize intermediate representations
within the neural network that is being trained for the discriminative task, such as injecting noise in
the layers of a ResNet (Wang et al., 2018b). 2) Measure distances directly on the inputs (or following
light preprocessing), but use a metric that is reflective of our perception of the data. Both approaches
allow for data driven specifications and also direct incorporation of prior knowledge about the domain.
We focus on the input space approach with the Wasserstein distance, in particular the Wasserstein-2
metric and geometry.
The Wasserstein distance is known to be an effective metric in the space of images, as demonstrated
in image retrieval problems (Rubner et al., 2000; Solomon et al., 2015, 2014) and related applications
(Peyré et al., 2019). In particular, the Wassersetin distance is robust to natural variations such as
translations and independent noise added to the pixel values. Importantly, the Wasserstein distance
exhibits a Riemannian metric structure. This allows us to define Wasserstein gradient penalties and
effective Wasserstein Gaussian noise1 in the space of images. The Wasserstein metric depends on
the specific location at which it is being evaluated, and can define neighborhoods with a reasonable
degree of semantic meaning. See, for example, the Wasserstein geodesics balls illustrated in Figure 1.
Our approach in this article is inspired by recent work (Dukler et al., 2019) which introduces a
Wasserstein ground metric for Wasserstein GANs and demonstrates that this facilitates training of
discriminators that are more stable to natural variations of image data. We suggest that regularization
based on Wasserstein geometry can make a discriminative function noticeably smoother along
the directions of natural variations of images, but without making it constant along the directions
of semantic variation. Moreover, a generative perturbation model can be folded into the training
objective (by computing the expectation value over perturbations of the Taylor expanded loss around
each training example). This yields an effective penalty term that integrates (up to a given order in
the expansion) a continuum of perturbations at once. The Wasserstein geometry on image space is
described by a metric tensor whose inverse is a linear weighted Laplacian matrix. This fact allows us
to compute the Wasserstein diffusion smoothness regularizer at a negligible cost.
In Section 2 we discuss adversarial attacks. In Section 3 we discuss training with input noise. We
propose a Wasserstein Gaussian distribution in image space, which reflects the natural local variability
of images. Then we compute the expectation of the perturbed objective by Taylor expansions in
the Wasserstein space. This leads to a Tikhonov-type Wasserstein diffusion smoothness regularizer.
In Section 5 we present preliminary experimental results. In Section 6 we discuss relations of the
proposed methods to some of the existing literature, and in Section 7 we offer a discussion.
2 Adversarial training and ground truth geometry
An adversarial attack is a perturbed version pi(x) of an input example x, which alters the prediction
of the classifier such that f(pi(x)) 6= f(x). According to this simplistic definition, every classifier
can be successfully attacked, provided it has at least two possible output values. Taking a more
refined perspective, consider g(x) as the best possible classification (ground truth / Bayes classifier).
Then a successful adversarial attack can be defined as a perturbation pi(x) of an input x such that
f(x) = g(x) but f(pi(x)) 6= g(pi(x)). This highlights that what we care about is not whether a
classifier changes its prediction when the input is slightly perturbed, but rather in what scenario it
changes its prediction.
In order to quantify the sensitivity to attacks, we need a measure of the size of the perturbation model
and the effect that it has on the classifier. Consider a loss function of the form
E(f) = Ep(y|x)p(x) [l(f(x), y)] . (1)
We can measure the detriment of the loss when the data is perturbed in comparison with the unper-
turbed loss. For generality, we define a perturbation pi at x as a random variable. For example, in the
case of samples from a vector space, additive perturbations take the form pi = x+ ξ, where ξ can be,
1Wasserstein Gaussians appear in the small time behavior of a process called Wasserstein diffusion, investi-
gated in continuous (von Renesse and Sturm, 2009) and discrete (Li, 2018) states.
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Figure 1: Shown are fixed-distance interpolates, measured by L2 and Wasserstein metrics, between
a source image and some other images in the MNIST data set. When training with smoothness
regularizers towards achieving robustness against adversarial perturbations that are perceptually
small, we need a good specification of semantically meaningful neighborhoods around which the
discriminative function should not change much. As we see, the Wasserstein metric defines a more
coherent neighborhood, with a natural interpretation in terms of continuous transportation of colors
between pixels, which depends on the input example. The right part illustrates the intuition that an
appropriate metric can capture larger in-class neighborhoods around an input image x, and hence
allow us to apply stronger smoothness regularization against perturbations pi(x) without hurting test
performance.
e.g., a zero mean Gaussian variable, or a deterministic value obtained by an attack strategy on the
input x. The level of perturbation can be quantified, for example, in terms of the maximum or average
size of the perturbations with respect to some norm, or in terms of the number of computations used
to construct the attacks. The loss under perturbations is then
Ep(pi|x)p(y|pi(x))p(x) [l(f(pi(x)), y)] . (2)
Unless we have access to the true labels given the perturbed inputs, i.e., the conditional probability
p(y|pi(x)) or the ground truth class g(pi(x)), this measure is just theoretical. In practice the relation
of labels to inputs is unknown, and for training we only have access to a training set {(xi, yi)}Ni=1
and possibly the perturbation model pi.
A natural approach to obtaining more robust classifiers is to train with perturbations. A special case
is adversarial training, where the perturbations are constructed specifically to deceive the classifier.
The problem with this approach is that typically the correct class labels for the perturbed input data
are unknown, as mentioned above. Therefore, typically one considers simply
Epi(f) = Ep(pi|x)p(y|x)p(x) [l(f(pi(x)), y)] . (3)
For a given pair (x, y) with y = g(x), in general y 6= g(pi(x)). Therefore, the perturbation needs
to be restricted in a way that ensures g(pi(x)) = g(x). The obvious and most common way to do
this without using further information or prior knowledge about the ground truth, is to restrict the
perturbations to be very small in some standard norm.
Adversarial examples are often constructed by minimizing the confidence of the discriminative
function or increasing the training loss with respect to the input. Since this does not incorporate prior
knowledge about the shape of the ground truth, usually the perturbations are restricted to lie within a
very small Lp ball around the input example. Naive input noise regularization and gradient penalties
suffer from a similar problem. When applied at the level that would be needed to prevent adversarial
attacks, they tend to smear out the classifier in all directions around the input examples, leading to
a significant detriment in test accuracy. A similar problem also arises in unsupervised adversarial
training, where the base point is arbitrary (not necessarily a training example) and one requires that
perturbations within a neighborhood are classified consistently. The situation is illustrated in the right
part of Figure 1. Another difficulty is that data augmentation can be very expensive both in terms of
the time it takes to compute each adversarial example and the number of examples that need to be
added to the training data in order to obtain a sufficient level of robustness.
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Instead of restricting the perturbations to be small in an Lp norm sense, we suggest to refine the metric
on input space and the perturbation model. We propose to measure distances on input space using the
Wasserstein metric and train with a corresponding Wasserstein Gaussian input noise. The Wasserstein
metric assigns a small distance to natural local variations of an input image. This means that larger
perturbations are more likely to remain within the class of the input example that is being perturbed.
In turn, we can apply higher levels of noise, allow for larger size perturbations in adversarial training,
or apply stronger gradient penalties during training. This is illustrated in Figure 1. In the next section
we derive an effective regularizer for training with the Wasserstein metric on input space and which
integrates the entire set of Wasserstein Gaussian noise perturbations (in a second order expansion) for
each input example at once.
3 Perturbed loss and Wasserstein diffusion Tikhonov regularizer
It is well known that training with input noise can be related to training the original objective with
an added penalty (Bishop, 1995). These derivations usually are based on Taylor expansion of the
perturbed loss around a given example. By default, the inputs are considered to live in Euclidean
space, with loss functions such as the mean square error or the log loss. Following the arguments
from the previous sections, we model the input space of images as a Wasserstein space. We then
derive the Wasserstein Taylor expansion of the perturbed loss and the corresponding regularization
penalties. Once the input space is regarded as a Wasserstein metric space, our derivations follow
Riemannian calculus therein.
We consider a perturbation model defined in terms of a “Wasserstein Gaussian”, which at a given
input image x ∈ X = P(Ω) has a density function of the form
p(ξ|x) = exp(−dW (x, x+ ξ)2/η2)d(ξ),
with a scale parameter η > 0 and a given reference measure d(ξ). Here the Wasserstein-q distance on
image space can be defined in the linear programming formulation as
dW (x, y) := inf
Π
(
E(a,b)∼Π [dΩ(a, b)q]
) 1
q , (4)
where Π is a joint distribution of pixel pairs (a, b) with marginals x, y. Here x, y are images viewed
as histograms over the set of pixels Ω. The pixel ground metric dΩ : Ω× Ω→ R+ assigns distances
to pairs of pixels. The ground metric dΩ can be defined in various ways that allow for efficient
computations, and it can be trained from examples. We focus on the case q = 2. In this case, we can
extract from the Wasserstein distance dW a Riemannian metric for the space of images. Locally, the
Wasserstein-2 distance can be expressed as
dW (x, x+ ξ)
2 = (ξ,GW (x)ξ)L2 + o(‖ξ‖2), (5)
where
∫
ξ(a)da = 0 and GW (x) = −
(∇a · (x∇a))−1 is the Wasserstein Riemannian metric tensor
at x. Here∇ and∇· are gradient and divergence operators in pixel space, with respect to a ∈ Ω. In
more details,
(ξ,GW (x)ξ)L2 =
∫
‖∇aΦ(a)‖2x(a)da,
where ξ(a) = −∇ · (x(a)∇Φ(a)). Here the classical Wasserstein metric is defined on the space of
images with equal total mass. This corresponds to the requirement
∫
ξ(a)da = 0. In general, we can
apply the metric in unnormalized image spaces as well; see related studies on unnormalized optimal
transport (Gangbo et al., 2019; Lee et al., 2019).
In practice we will consider a discrete pixel space Ω = {1, . . . , n}. In this case, the Wasserstein
Riemannian metric GW (x) is an n×n symmetric positive definite matrix that we will discuss further
in the next section. Practically, the Wasserstein noise model corresponds to Gaussian noise with a
covariance matrix η2G−1W (x) that depends on the input x and the choice of a ground metric dΩ over
pixels.
We are now ready to present our theorem that relates training with Wasserstein diffusion to training
with an added penalty term.
Theorem 1 (Perturbed loss regularization). Consider an input space (X , g) with the Riemannian
metric g represented by a matrix G(x) depending on x ∈ X , and consider the loss E(f) =
4
E[l(f(x), y)] from equation 1 with some error function l that is twice differentiable in the first
argument. Let ξ be a Gaussian noise variable with zero mean and covariance matrix η2G−1(x)
depending on x. Then the perturbed loss from equation 3 takes the form
Eξ(f) = E(f) +
1
2
η2ER(f) + o(η2),
where
ER(f) = Ep(y|x)p(x)
[
l′′(f(x), y)‖∇gf(x)‖2g + l′(f(x), y)∆gf(x)
]
.
Here l′ and l′′ denote the first and second order ordinary partial derivatives of l with respect to the
first argument, and∇g , ‖ · ‖g , ∆g are the gradient, norm, and Laplace-Beltrami operators on (X , g).
The proof is provided in Appendix A. In this paper, we focus on G(x) = GW (x). This tells us that
training with Wasserstein Gaussian noise corresponds, to second order in the noise level, to training
with the unperturbed loss plus a penalty to the squared Wasserstein gradient norm and Laplace
operators of the discriminative function.
We are also interested in non-zero mean perturbations, such as adversarial perturbations used in
adversarial training. In this case the proof of the theorem yields the expansion
Eξ(f) = E(f) + E
R(f) +O(‖ξ‖2),
where
ER(f) = Ep(y|x)p(x)
[
l′(f(x), y) · (Ep(ξ|x)[ξ]>∇f(x))] .
If the perturbation is deterministic, Ep(ξ|x)[ξ] is simply ξ(x). This suggests to regularize by penalizing
the directional derivative of the discriminative function in the direction of the perturbation. If the
perturbation is proportional to the Euclidean steepest descent direction of the discriminative function,
ξ ∝ ∇f(x), then the penalty is proportional to ‖∇f‖2. If the perturbation is proportional to
the Riemannian steepest descent direction, ξ ∝ ∇gf(x) = G−1(x)∇f(x), then the penalty is
proportional to the Riemannian gradient norm squared, ‖∇gf(x)‖2g .
Example 2 (Square error). For the square error l(f(x), y) = (f(x)− y)2 and a perturbation model
as in Theorem 1, we obtain the regularizer
ER(f) = Ep(y|x)p(x)
[
‖∇gf(x)‖2g + (f(x)− y)∆gf(x)
]
.
For non-zero mean perturbations, we can consider an expansion to first order which gives
ER(f) = Ep(y|x)p(x)
[
2(f(x)− y) · Ep(ξ|x)[ξ]>∇f(x)
]
.
Example 3 (Cross entropy error). For the cross entropy l(f(x), y) = −y ln(f(x))− (1− y) ln(1−
f(x)) and a perturbation model as in Theorem 1, we obtain the regularizer
ER(f) = Ep(y|x)p(x)
[( y
f2(x)
+
1− y
(1− f(x))2
)
‖∇gf(x)‖2g+
(
− y
f(x)
+
(1− y)
(1− f(x))
)
∆gf(x)
]
.
In the case of k outputs (e.g., k-class classification), the loss function is simply the sum of the loss
for each output times 1/k. For non-zero mean perturbations we obtain
ER(f) = Ep(y|x)p(x)
[(
− y
f(x)
+
1− y
(1− f(x))
)
· Ep(ξ|x)[ξ]>∇f(x)
]
.
Example 4 (Euclidean inputs). In the case of Euclidean inputs and uncorrelated zero mean Gaussian
noise of variance η2, we recover some of the classic calculations by Bishop (1995). Consider as an
example the square error function, for which the regularizer becomes
ER(f) = Ep(y|x)p(x)
[∑
i
{(
∂f
∂xi
)2
+ (f(x)− y)∂
2f
∂x2i
}]
.
As pointed out by Bishop (1995), this is the Tikhonov regularizer that is usually added to the sum of
squares error.
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Theorem 1 shows that all noise perturbed versions of a given input example can be integrated (in
a second order sense) into a single term. Formally, equivalence of the regularizer to training with
noise is only valid for small values of η, since it is based on a second order Taylor expansion. The
Wasserstein diffusion smoothness regularizer ER also has the natural interpretation as decreasing
the variability of the classifier in an anisotropic and input dependent way that is captured by the
Wasserstein gradient norm and the Laplace-Beltrami operator. This interpretation remains valid for
arbitrarily large values of η, even if in this case the regularized objective might no longer correspond
to the integrated perturbed objective.
We note that the term involving the Laplace-Beltrami operator is premultiplied with the derivative of
the error. For regular choices of l, if the classifier makes correct predictions on the training inputs x
(which is often the case), the derivative l′(f(x), y) will vanish. This suggests that for the purpose of
regularization in settings where the training error vanishes, we can omit the Laplace-Beltrami term
and consider only the gradient penalty.
Taking the perspective of smoothness suggests that we may also regularize by penalizing the gradient
of the discriminator, instead of the gradient of the loss function. Finally, we point out that the
Wasserstein metric can also be used to define the size constraints for adversarial training. Usually
adversarial perturbations are constrained to have L∞ norm (or some Lp norm) bounded by a small .
Instead of using ‖ξ‖Lp ≤ , we can use ‖ξ‖W ≤ , or simply ξ>GW (x)ξ ≤ .
4 Training with the Wasserstein diffusion Tikhonov regularizer
In this section we describe the implementation of the regularization scheme introduced in Section 3.
Theorem 1 suggests to replace the original objective function by a regularized objective E + η2ER,
where η corresponds to the strength of the regularization. For each training example x we add
l′′(f(x), y) · ‖∇W f(x)‖2W + l′(f(x), y) ·∆W f(x). (6)
The first term of equation 6 involves the Wasserstein gradient of the discriminative function f
with respect to the input. This type of calculation appeared recently in the context of Wasserstein
Generative Adversarial Networks with Wasserstein ground metric (Dukler et al., 2019). We regard
each input image as a histogram over pixels. Then we define a weighted graph G = (V,E, ω),
where the vertices V = {1, . . . , n} correspond to pixels, edges E connect adjacent pixels, and ω is a
symmetric matrix of weights ωij associated to the edges. The normalized volume form on node i ∈ I
is given by di =
∑
j∈N(i) ωij∑n
i=1
∑
i′∈N(i) ωii′
. For computational efficiency, we consider sparse graphs with a
local connectivity structure that is invariant with respect to vertical and horizontal shifts in the pixel
domain. In the experiments, we use local grids of radius rad = 2, 4, 6, 8 and constant weights.
The Laplacian matrix associated with the weighted graph G is defined, depending on the input x, as
L(x)ij =

1
2
∑
k∈N(i) ωik(
xi
di
+ xkdk ), if i = j
− 12ωij(xidi +
xj
dj
), if j ∈ N(i)
0, otherwise.
The Wasserstein metric tensor is the matrix function given by the (pseudo) inverse of the weighted
Laplacian operator,
GW (x) = L(x)
−1 ∈ Rn×n.
Written explicitly, the Wasserstein gradient norm squared is
‖∇W f(x)‖2W = ∇f(x)>GW (x)−1∇f(x)
= ∇f(x)>L(x)∇f(x)
=
∑
(i,j)∈E
ωij
(
∂
∂xi
f(x)− ∂
∂xj
f(x)
)2
xi/di + xj/dj
2
. (7)
An efficient implementation of equation 7 is described in Appendix C.
The second term of equation 6, the Wasserstein Laplace-Beltrami of the discriminative function, is
computed as
∆W f(x) = tr(L(x)∇2f(x)) +∇f(x)TL(x)∇ log det(L(x))− 12 ).
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Here det(L(x))−
1
2 is the volume form for the Wasserstein manifold. Here det(L(x)) is the product
of non-singular eigenvalues. For well-posedness of the volume form, we consider a compact set in
the interior of a finite dimensional probability simplex. In this case, L(x) is a positive definite matrix,
and det(L(x))−
1
2 is well defined. In practice, we could also consider the reference density as the
Lebesgue measure, which omits the volume term. Details on the implementation are provided in
Appendix B. We leave a more systematic study and computation of the Wasserstein Laplace-Beltrami
term for future work.
5 Experiments
In this section we present initial experimental results, leaving a more extensive experimental evalua-
tion for future work. We evaluate the utility of Wassserstein smoothness regularization in terms of
the robustness of the trained classifiers to small and large perturbations. We focus on regularization
by the Wasserstein gradient norm penalty.
5.1 Stability to adversarial perturbations of the input data
In this experiment we test the effectiveness of the gradient penalty regularizer in terms of the test
accuracy of the trained classifiers. We train a ResNet-20 on clean images from CIFAR-10 with
gradient norm penalty computed under Euclidean and Wasserstein metrics. We run grid search for
the regularization strength and the radius defining the ground metric on pixel space. The training
error converges to zero in all cases. We consider two types of test data: the clean test data set (natural
generalization) and the test data set with each test example perturbed by an adversarial attack (robust
generalization). Following current literature, adversarial perturbations are computed by FGSM and
I-FGSM (Goodfellow et al., 2015; Kurakin et al., 2017). More details on the implementation and
hyperparameters are provided in Appendix D. Our results, reported in Table 1, compare well with the
state of the art for CIFAR-10, where current works report robust test error for FGSM  = 8/255 of
37.52%, and for I-FGSM-20 α = 2/255,  = 8/255 of 42.06% (Wang et al., 2018b).
Test data \ Regularizer None Euclidean grad. Wassserstein grad.
Natural 16.29 15.61 15.35
FGSM  = 8/255 82.22 31.10 30.20
FGSM  = 25/255 89.72 66.83 44.32
I-FGSM-20 α = 2/255,  = 8/255 90.15 40.06 32.12
Table 1: Robust test error percentage (lower is better) for a ResNet-20 network with softplus activation
trained for 200 epochs on clean CIFAR-10 training images using gradient norm regularization with
Euclidean and Wasserstein metric on image space. We run grid search over the regularization strength
and the ground metric radius on pixel space.
5.2 Stability to large in-class variations of the input data
Most work on adversarial robustness focuses on small perturbations, with adversarial attacks restricted
to have a small norm so that they remain imperceptible to humans. We are interested in generalization
for all kinds of in-class variations of the data, including large perturbations that should not change the
predicted class. In this experiment we train on the clean CIFAR-10 training set (no data augmentation),
and compare between no regularization, Euclidean, and Wasserstein smoothness regularization. For
testing, we randomly draw 1000 images from the natural test set and construct for each of them a
sequence of translated versions with padding, as depicted in Figure 2. The semantic meaning of
images should remain constant under relatively large translations, and therefore we expect a robust
classifier to label all images in the sequence similarly. Quantitatively, this is measured by the number
of label flips in the sequence. We report the average number of label flips over all sequences of test
images in Table 2. As the table shows, Wasserstein gradient regularization improves the robustness
of the classifier to translations.
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Figure 2: Robust classifiers should be invariant to natural variations of the data. Shown are horizontal
translations of an image from CIFAR-10.
Perturbation \ Regularizer None Euclidean grad. Wasserstein grad.
Horizontal translation 10.009 7.898 6.488
Vertical translation 9.920 9.437 7.956
Table 2: Average number of prediction flips on sequences of translated test images from CIFAR-10.
The classifiers were trained on the clean CIFAR-10 training set with no data augmentation, with
either no regularization, Euclidean Tikhonov regularization, or Wasserstein Tikhonov regularization.
6 Related works
There are many works related to Wasserstein geometry, robustness, regularization. In this section we
briefly mention some of the literature in relation to our discussion in this article.
Adversarial robustness. Previous works have investigated postprocessing with Jacobian regulariza-
tion (Jakubovitz and Giryes, 2018) and cross Lipschitz regularization (Hein and Andriushchenko,
2017), whereby the input space was modeled as Euclidean space. The duality of attack norms and
Lipschitz norms has been discussed as well (Finlay et al., 2019). Perturbation based regularization
has been proposed (Yan et al., 2018), which penalizes the negative size of the deep fool attack in
proportion to the size of the input. Gaussian data augmentation was proposed too (Zantedeschi et al.,
2017), but evaluated by Monte Carlo samples and using Euclidean space. Recently, the tradeoff
between natural and robust classification errors was studied, leading to a training objective with
an added term of the form Ex[maxx′∈B(x,) φ(f(x)f(x′)/λ)] (Zhang et al., 2019). Similar to ours,
this approach penalizes the variability of the classifier, but it is not incorporating priors about the
geometry of the classes. While working on this article, we became aware of a work using modified
Sinkhorn iterations to approximate projections of adversarial examples onto a Wasserstein ball (Wong
et al., 2019). This is similar to the adversarial norm constraint that we suggested here. However,
our approach is based on a Riemannian metric formulation, which allows us to obtain a very simple
quadratic form approximation of the norm and also to integrate a generative noise model (Wasserstein
diffusion) into an effective smoothness regularizer.
Wasserstein sample space. Optimal transport has been applied to the design of training objectives (Ar-
jovsky et al., 2017). Recently this has been combined with a Wasserstein metric on image data
space (Dukler et al., 2019). The Kantorovich duality of the Wasserstein training objective leads to a
Lipschitz constraint on the discriminator networks, which itself is computed in Wasserstein space.
This approach is known as the Wasserstein of Wasserstein GAN (WWGAN). Our regularization
penalty derived from expanding a Wasserstein Gaussian noise variable in the input space of a classi-
fier also includes a term that penalizes the Wasserstein gradient norm. However, our analysis has a
different motivation and interpretation and also reveals higher order expansion terms.
Wasserstein diffusion. The noise in Wasserstein space has been studied in continuous (von Renesse
and Sturm, 2009) and discrete (Li, 2018) state spaces. The present work seems to be the first to apply
Wasserstein type noise in machine learning. In this trend, the definition and efficient computation of
the Riemannian volume form on Wasserstein space remains an open problem for future work.
Wasserstein Information Geometry. The Wasserstein metric is gaining traction not only in the design
of training objectives and in the definition of geometric structures on the sample space of generative
models, but also in the development of natural gradients and optimizers (Li, 2018; Li and Montúfar,
2018; Li and Montúfar, 2018). Recently this has been applied to GANs (Lin et al., 2018). In this paper,
we derive and apply second order calculus of Wasserstein geometry for improving generalization,
especially improving the robustness to adversarial attacks.
Robustness and regularization. Wasserstein balls have appeared in the context of robust density
estimation (Shafieezadeh-Abadeh et al., 2017), where they are also related to a form of Tikhonov
8
regularization. Wasserstein distributionally robust stochastic optimization has been related to regular-
ization by certain empirical gradient norms (Gao et al., 2017). Close to our derivations, albeit not
involving Wasserstein geometry, is the work by Bishop (1995), which shows that training with noise
is equivalent to Tikhonov regularization.
7 Discussion
Training with input noise or data augmentation in general is known as an effective form of regu-
larization to obtain classifiers that are more robust to natural variations of the data, or to reduce
the sensitivity to perturbations. These methods usually have a high cost in terms of the number of
examples needed and the cost of computing each of them (especially in the case of adversarial data
augmentation obtained by iterated gradient methods). Another problem is that usually noise models
and adversarial examples need to be restricted to tiny norm values to ensure that they remain within
the class of the perturbed example. Smoothness regularizers based on Lp metrics are usually limited
in the same way. In this paper we follow the idea that the space of inputs is not Euclidean and that
smoothness priors should be implemented with respect to an appropriate metric, which in turn would
allow us to apply higher levels of regularization without hurting test performance. We propose to use
the Wasserstein-2 metric to capture semantically meaningful neighborhoods of images. As we show,
the Wasserstein diffusion smoothness regularizer arises naturally by expanding and integrating the
loss with respect to Wasserstein Gaussian noise on the inputs. We obtain an effective penalty that can
be computed very efficiently, saving computation compared with adversarial data augmentation, and
has a negligible overhead over L2 gradient penalties. Preliminary experimental results indicate that
our methods can significantly improve robust generalization performance on CIFAR-10. We obtain
models that are robust not only to small perturbations (the usual setting in adversarial robustness
literature), but also to large scale in-class perturbations, such as translations. We think that this is
conceptually an important step towards learning models that generalize better in relation to all types
of natural variations of the input data, not only small perturbations.
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A Proof of Theorem 1
A Riemannian metric g defines an inner product between tangent vectors of the input space at
each possible location. We choose standard coordinates for the input space X = Rn and write
g(ξ, ζ) = (ξ, ζ)g = ξ
>G(x)ζ for any pair ξ, ζ ∈ TxX . We implicitly identify TxX and X so that
adding a tangent vector ξ ∈ TxX to an input vector x ∈ X makes sense. The Riemannian gradient
with the metric g is given by ∇gf(x) = G−1(x)∇f(x), where ∇ is the ordinary gradient. This is
also known as the natural gradient.
Proof of Theorem 1. We expand the error function l around a data point x with added noise ξ in the
Riemannian space (X , g). We obtain
l(f(x+ ξ), y) = l(f(x), y) + l′(f(x), y)(∇gf(x), ξ)g
+
1
2
l′′(f(x), y)(∇gf(x), ξ)2g +
1
2
l′(f(x), y)
∑
i,j
ξiξj(∇2gf(x))ij + o(‖ξ‖2g).
11
We discuss the individual terms in turn. The zero order term is just the unperturbed loss. On taking
the expectation value with respect to ξ given x, the linear term vanishes when we assume that the
perturbations have zero mean, Ep(ξ|x)[ξ] = 0. If the perturbation does not have zero mean, we obtain
Ep(ξ|x)[(∇gf(x), ξ)g] = Ep(ξ|x)[(G−1(x)∇f(x))>G(x)ξ] = ∇f(x)>Ep(ξ|x)[ξ].
For the first quadratic term, when Ep(ξ|x)[ξξ>] = η2G−1(x), we obtain
Ep(ξ|x)[(∇gf(x)>G(x)ξ)2] = η2∇gf(x)>G(x)∇gf(x) = η2‖∇gf‖2g.
For the second quadratic term, again when Ep(ξ|x)[ξξ>] = η2G−1(x), we obtain
Ep(ξ|x)[ξ>Hess f(x)ξ] = η2∆gf(x).
Here the Laplace-Beltrami operator is
∆gf =
∑
j,k
gjk
∂2f
∂xj∂xk
− gjkΓljk
∂f
∂xl
,
where Γljk is the Christoffel symbol.
B Riemannian calculus in Wasserstein space over discrete states
In this section, we review the definition of Wasserstein-2 Riemannian metric on discrete states
founded in (Chow et al., 2012; Maas, 2011; Mielke, 2011) and developed in (Chow et al., 2018)
and (Li and Montúfar, 2018). See Wasserstein Riemannian calculus in (Li, 2018). We also discuss
practical implementations of the Laplace-Beltrami operator appearing in the Wasserstein Tikhonov
regularizer.
Consider I = {1, . . . , n}. The probability simplex on I is the set
P+(I) =
{
(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Rn :
n∑
i=i
xi = 1, xi > 00
}
.
Here x = (x1, . . . , xn) is a probability vector with coordinates xi corresponding to the probabilities
assigned to each node i ∈ I .
We next define the Wasserstein-2 metric tensor on P+(I). This is given in terms of a undirected
graph with weighted edges, G = (I, E, ω), where I is the vertex set, E ⊆ (I2) is the edge set, and
ω = (ωij)i,j∈I ∈ Rn×n is a matrix of edge weights satisfying
ωij =
{
ωji > 0, if (i, j) ∈ E
0, otherwise
.
The set of neighbors (adjacent vertices) of i is denoted by N(i) = {j ∈ V : (i, j) ∈ E}. The
normalized volume form on node i ∈ I is given by di =
∑
j∈N(i) ωij∑n
i=1
∑
i′∈N(i) ωii′
.
The graph structure G = (I, E, ω) induces a graph Laplacian matrix function.
Definition 1 (Weighted Laplacian matrix). Given an undirected weighted graph G = (I, E, ω), with
I = {1, . . . , n}, the matrix function L(·) : Rn → Rn×n is defined as
L(p) = DTΛ(x)D, x = (xi)
n
i=1 ∈ Rn,
where
• D ∈ R|E|×n is the discrete gradient operator given by
D(i,j)∈E,k∈V =

√
ωij , if i = k, i > j
−√ωij , if j = k, i > j
0, otherwise,
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• −DT ∈ Rn×|E| is the oriented incidence matrix, and
• Λ(x) ∈ R|E|×|E| is a weight matrix depending on x,
Λ(x)(i,j)∈E,(k,l)∈E =
{
1
2 (
1
di
xi +
1
dj
xj), if (i, j) = (k, l) ∈ E
0, otherwise.
We are now ready to present the Wasserstein-2 metric tensor. Consider the tangent space of P+(I)
at x,
TxP+(I) =
{
(σi)
n
i=1 ∈ Rn :
n∑
i=1
σi = 0
}
.
Definition 2 (Wasserstein-2 metric tensor). The inner product g : TxP+(I)× TxP+(I)→ R takes
any two tangent vectors σ1, σ2 ∈ TpP+(I) to
gx(σ1, σ2) := σ1
TL(x)−1σ2, for any σ1, σ2 ∈ TxP+(I),
where L(x)−1 is the pseudo inverse of L(x).
Here L(x)−1ij plays the role of gij in the last subsection A. Using this metric tensor, the Riemannian
calculus in (P+(I), g) has the following formulations.
(i) The Christoffel symbol ΓWx : TxP+(I)× TxP+(I)→ TxP+(I) forms:
ΓWx (σ1, σ2) = −
1
2
[
L(σ1)L(ρ)
−1σ2 +L(σ2)L(ρ)−1σ1
]
+
1
2
L(ρ)
(
∇GL(ρ)−1σ1◦∇GL(ρ)−1σ2
)
,
where σ1, σ2 ∈ TxP+(I) and(∇GL(ρ)−1σ1 ◦ ∇GL(ρ)−1σ2) = ( 1
2di
∑
j∈N(i)
(∇ijL(ρ)−1σ1)(∇ijL(ρ)−1σ2)
)n
i=1
∈ Rn.
(ii) Given F ∈ C∞(P+(I)), the Riemannian gradient is
gradWF (x) =
(
L(x)−1
)−1
∇F (x) = L(x)∇F (x),
where∇ is the Euclidean L2 derivative w.r.t. x.
(iii) The Riemannian Hessian operator HessWF (ρ) : TρP+(M)× TρP+(M)→ R is given by
HessWF (x)(σ1, σ2) =σT1∇2F (x)σ2 +
n∑
i=1
ΓWx (σ1, σ2)i∇xiF (x),
where σ1, σ2 ∈ TxP+(I).
(iv) The Riemannian volume is given by
volW (x) = det(L(x))−
1
2 = Πn−1i=1 λi(x)
− 12 ,
where λi(x) are the positive eigenvalues of L(x).
(v) The Laplacian–Beltrami operator is given by
∆WF (x) = tr(L(x)
( ∂2f
∂xi∂xj
)
1≤i,j≤n
) +∇f(x)TL(x)∇ log det(L(x))− 12 .
If the reference measure is a Lebesgue measure in a simplex, the modified Wasserstein Laplacian
operator satisfies
∆˜W f(x) =tr(L(x)(
∂2f
∂xi∂xj
)1≤i,j≤n)
=
∑
(i,j)∈E
ωij
(
∂2
∂x2i
f(x)− 2 ∂
2
∂xi∂xj
f(x) +
∂2
∂x2j
f(x)
)
xi/di + xj/dj
2
.
(8)
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C Efficient implementation of the Wasserstein gradient norm
To compute equation 7 in practice, we define a suitable similarity graph G = (V,E, ω) for the space
of images, displaying translation invariance and symmetries. First, there is the invariance with respect
to pixel translations. Symmetries arise since the distance from a pixel to two spatially opposite pixels
is equal. In addition, each term in the sum in equation 7 can be decomposed into the product of linear
relations between values in nodes i and j. Each linear relation (e.g ∇Xif − ∇Xjf ) is computed
via a convolution, in this case on∇XF . Convolutions may replace a linear product owing it to the
described symmetries and invariances. For each relative neighbor direction we define a convolutional
filter with the number of filters equal to the number of neighbors. For the truncated similarity graph
for the Wasserstein distance, the edge set E is sparse and the number of convolutional filters is
reduced considerably from n2. We therefore can calculate all pairs ∇Xif − ∇Xjf with a given
relative neighbor relation by passing X and ∇Xf through of kernels KO1 . . .KOd . In this case a
neighbor relation, is defined as the geometrical pattern between two pixels. A pixel located in position
(10, 10) satisfies a neighbor relation (1, 2) with a pixel in location (11, 12). The neighbor relation is
indeed invariant to the global position of the pixel which allows for the use of convolutions. Given a
ground metric, we enumerate all non-zero neighbor relations as O1, . . .Od, for truncated distances
this is much smaller than the complete edge graph. For each neighbor relation Ok we associate a
zero-valued kernel that equals 1 and −1 in the corresponding Ok pixels, we denote the gradient
kernels as KOk . Likewise, we apply the same Ok pattern, now with 12 , 12 in the corresponding
neighbor pattern pixels to obtain the terms Xi/di+Xj/dj2 . For each i, j we denote the input kernels
as MOk . Applying entry-wise multiplication () and a summation collapsing all pixel locations
and channels then yields an efficient and general method of calculating the Wasserstein gradient
‖ grad f‖W2,d(Ω) for general local cost metrics on highly optimized convolution.
Algorithm 1 Wasserstein gradient norm ‖ grad f(X)‖2W .
Require: The pixel graph G = (V,E, ω); local weights (wij); neighbor relation tuples arranged
symmetrically O1 . . .Od
Require: Euclidean gradient∇Xf
1: Wasserstein-grad← 0
2: for neighbor relations k = 1, . . . , d do
3: Build kernel KOk to compute∇Xif −∇XOk(i)f
4: Build corresponding kernel MOk to compute
Xi
2di
+
XOk
2dOk
5: H ← KOk(∇Xf)
6: V ←MOk(X)
7: H ← H H (entry-wise multiplication)
8: W ← H  V
9: Wasserstein-grad← Wasserstein-grad + sum(W )
10: end for
11: Return ‖ grad f(X)‖2W = Wasserstein-grad
D Details on the experimental setup
For our experiments, we use the CIFAR-10 dataset, and perform white-box attacks on the ResNet20
network. For training, we fixed the batch size of 128, and used SGD with momentum and weight
decay, where the momentum value is 0.9 and the weight-decay value is 10−4. We start with a learning
rate of 0.1, and at epoch 100 and 150 we divide the learning rate by 10 each time.
We examine the case of training the ResNet-20 network on the CIFAR-10 dataset, where the only
data augmentation performed is normalization. This achieves a test accuracy of 83.71%. We then
examine the effect of modifying the loss objective with either the Euclidean or Wasserstein gradient
penalties of the original loss, namely we use the loss
`(f(x), y) + η2(∇x`(f(x), y), G(x)−1∇x`(f(x), y)),
where ∇x is the Euclidean gradient and G(x) ∈ Rd×d represents the metric used in sample space.
For the Wasserstein gradient norm, G(x)−1 = L(x). For the Euclidean gradient norm, G(x) = I .
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